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Abstract—Upgrading telecommunications access 
networks requires large investments in deploying 
new optical infrastructure, especially in terms of 
construction works and costs to reach the end-user, 
which seem only affordable in densely populated 
areas. By evaluating a cost-benefit analysis for the 
deployment of a Point-to-Point dark fiber 
infrastructure, this paper investigates how the 
economic risk of dark fiber deployment can be 
estimated and/or reduced in different settings. By 
applying the model on specific scenarios, which 
differ in area type, demand uptake and revenue 
scheme, it is concluded that the business case is only 
viable in a dense urban area with an aggressive take-
up. In the other scenarios, the paper investigates 
possibilities and opportunities to improve the 
business case and hence decrease the investment 
risk. Examples of this improvement include 
prolonging the planning horizon, ensuring revenue 
from the start of the project by performing demand 
aggregation or examining where public funds might 
help. 
 
Index Terms— Cost-Benefit Analysis, Next-
Generation Access Networks, Passive Infrastructure, 
Techno-Economics 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the upgrades of backbone and core networks, the 
next step in upgrading the telecommunications access 
networks is deploying fiber all the way to  consumers’ 
homes. This upgrade however demands significant 
investment costs, mostly in the deployment of the passive 
infrastructure (up to 70% of deployment cost), and proves to 
only be viable in densely populated areas [1].  
As such, many incumbents defect from investing, not only 
because of the large investment cost, but also because of 
regulatory uncertainty. Currently, there is a large number 
of  of laws, guidelines and directives on different levels of 
the hierarchical decision structure. National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs) should implement the directives 
formulated by the European Commission, but different 
opinions and interpretations of those directives often lead to 
different implementations, which hinder the development of 
one single telecommunications market across Europe. 
As exactly achieving this single telecommunications market 
and offering broadband to all was set out as one of Europe’s 
goals for bringing the benefits of a digital society and 
economy to Europe's citizens, the business case of deploying 
Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) networks should be explored 
further by searching for opportunities to improve it [2]. 
 
The economic implications of deploying Next Generation 
Access (NGA) and FTTH networks have been the subject of 
many studies, papers and publications, all indicating the 
difficulties and stressing the risks. The literature on the 
issue is now enormous and only a sample of remarkable 
work is referred to here ([3] - [8]).  
In [3], the authors evaluate the viability of different 
“flavors” of FTTH, thereby focusing on needed revenues for 
different market shares and duct availabilities. They define 
generic areas (clusters), so that each region in Europe can 
be assumed to be similar to one of them (an approach that is 
also used in this paper – albeit to on a higher level). They 
focus on a comparison of different types of architectures 
(Ethernet Point-to-Point (P2P), Gigabit Passive Optical 
Network (GPON) over P2P, GPON over Point-to-multipoint 
(P2MP) and Wavelength Division Multiplexing PON), and 
provide conclusions on both technological as well as 
economical results. On a technological level, they conclude 
that a P2P topology is more future-proof as it can deliver 
much higher bandwidths whereas for PONs, the bandwidth 
capacity needs to be shared amongst multiple users. From 
an economic perspective, their results state that about 64% 
of the regions could be profitably covered with GPON, 
compared to only 50% with P2P. 
A study by Analysys Mason [4] on the UK market 
furthermore shows the importance of uptake on Return on 
Investment (ROI). As their study clearly shows that the 
fixed costs of deployment are much higher than the variable 
costs, it stresses the need for “demand stimulation 
initiatives and pre-registration schemes” [4]. This study also 
applies the clustering method by dividing the United 
Kingdom into different general ‘geotypes’. 
 
In actual FTTH deployments, responsibilities are typically 
split in three conceptual levels [9]. On the lowest level, the 
physical infrastructure provider (PIP) is responsible for 
right-of-way, ducts and fibers. The middle level actor, the 
network provider (NP), is responsible for the equipment 
providing network connectivity on top of that (Ethernet and 
IP layers as well as the wavelength layers if applicable). 
Finally, there is the service provider (SP) that offers end-
consumers the actual services, such as single or multi-play 
packages, streaming and on-demand services, etc. When 
zooming in on the cost structure, it is the lowest (physical 
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infrastructure) layer that accounts for the largest part of the 
initial investment cost in network deployment [1], [6], 
especially when considering buried rollout, which is the 
most common approach in Europe, and in some regions the 
only allowed one (as this is a decision taken by the local 
authorities). Within the total cost for dark fiber rollout 
(cabling infrastructure), the civil engineering works needed 
for trenching take up the most significant part of the cost 
(the manual trenching and installation costs of the fiber are 
up to 500 times higher than the cost for the actual fibers 
themselves [7]). It is therefore typically the investment in 
this layer of the network that is postponed by current 
telecom operators. Incumbents, for example, focus their 
strategy on upgrading the existing Digital Subscriber Line 
(DSL) technology, e.g. through vectoring, instead of 
deploying new infrastructure [10].  
 
Furthermore, there is a large difference in profitability 
forecasts for different areas, as can be seen from 
quantitative analysis of full network deployments (e.g. 
WDM and TDM PONs - Wavelength and Time Division 
Multiplexing PONs) in dense urban, urban and suburban 
areas [3], [4], [8]) as well as from real-life deployments: most 
operational and successful FTTH networks in Europe are 
located in larger cities, not in remote areas.  
As in a lot of areas, FTTH deployment will not be 
economically viable, a need rises to search for improvements 
to the business case of dark fiber deployment, on both 
technical and economic level. Possible improvements include 
charging higher monthly prices from end-users, cross-
subsidizing from profitable to non-profitable areas or 
subsidizing from state budget [5]. These proposals are 
however not certain to work out, as users’ willingness to pay 
will in some cases not exceed the competitive DSL pricing, 
while state funding is not allowed everywhere by the 
European Union. One thus has to look for other 
alternatives, some of which will be presented in this paper. 
 
Within the European project OASE [11], a reference model 
was developed to calculate costs and needed revenues for 
the different layers of an FTTH network. This model will be 
adjusted here to evaluate the business case for passive fiber 
infrastructure deployment and operations. Based on 
adoption forecast trends and typical values for population 
densities, nine scenarios are set up, of which each scenario 
represents the combination of an identified adoption curve 
(conservative/likely/aggressive) and an area (dense 
urban/urban/rural). This systematic approach of defining 
generic areas and adoption curves allows covering most 
types of regions in Europe, and is therefore widely 
applicable as an estimation for the techno-economic viability 
of FTTH deployment. 
This paper will evaluate the business case in each of the 
proposed scenarios, and will search for necessary 
improvements in the cases where the results are not 
economically viable. As such, the effects of social (e.g. 
demand aggregation) and economic measures (such as 
prolonging the planning horizon, which is possible for the 
future proof P2P topology) are combined with earlier 
proposed technical measures (e.g. duct reuse [3]) as well as 
political and state intervention (providing subsidies and 
state aid) where necessary. 
Before analyzing the reference scenarios quantitatively, we 
will first describe the current regulatory policy and funding 
possibilities in the European Union in section II. Section III 
will perform the quantitative cost-benefit analysis for the 
passive infrastructure for the reference scenarios, i.e. under 
market conditions that can be expected based on current 
forecast trends. As the results of that section will show, the 
business case for the PIP will not be economically viable, 
except for a dense urban area where a high subscription 
rate can be expected. Section IV will therefore look into 
possibilities to improve this business case. Section V 
concludes the paper by indicating economic and policy 
recommendations to make a viable business case for FTTH 
access network deployment. 
II. CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME  
Although the mindset of all regulatory authorities is set in 
the same direction, namely towards offering broadband to 
all, and achieving one single telecommunications market 
across Europe, the variety and diversity of regulatory 
institutions on regional, national and European level, which 
all have their own interpretation of the rules and 
guidelines, make it hard to see the overview. Furthermore, 
this section will show that public financial aid is not 
possible in Europe, except for a few specific cases. By 
presenting an overview of the different regulatory decisions 
and their consequences, this section gives a further 
motivation for searching for improvement measures for the 
business case for the PIP.  
A. Current Regulation  
Currently, broadband is regulated in EU Member States by 
the NRAs in order to avoid distortions of competition and 
ensure universal access. Incumbent operators, that have a 
Significant Market Power (SMP), are required to provide 
access to their networks, in order to enable consumers to 
choose between broadband providers. The rollout of NGA 
networks does not remove the existing competition concerns 
regarding broadband since incumbents could leverage the 
dominant position they enjoy as owners of non-replicable 
legacy access infrastructure to monopolize new broadband 
services provided over this infrastructure and thereby limit 
consumer choice.  
Unless it can be established that NGA access services are 
markets different from the current regulated wholesale 
broadband markets, dominant operators with SMP in the 
NGA markets are comparable to SMP operators on the 
copper network, and hence, complying with the European 
Competition Recommendation [12], access to their NGA 
networks should be regulated.  
Taking this into account, the Commission has taken an 
overwhelmingly favorable view towards State measures for 
broadband deployment for rural and underserved areas, 
whilst being more critical for aid measures in areas where a 
broadband infrastructure already exists and competition 
takes place. 
The Broadband Guidelines [13] outline the rules and 
conditions on where and how public funding could be 
provided to build broadband networks in line with the 
European Union State Aid rules. These Guidelines provide 
guidance for governments and public authorities on how to 
finance very high speed, NGA networks, as well as 
addressing the funding of traditional broadband networks.  
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The main aim of the Guidelines is to facilitate a rapid 
deployment of broadband in Europe by providing to all 
stakeholders (including local and regional authorities, as 
well as network operators) a clear, predictable and 
comprehensive framework for the public financing of such 
networks. The latter means EU State Aid rules would play a 
role in channeling public funding to areas where private 
companies have no commercial incentives to invest – for 
instance because of the high costs of deploying broadband 
networks, the low population density or the low levels of 
economic activities. State Aid can have a crucial role to 
extend adequate broadband services to all European 
citizens – no matter whether they are living in large urban 
areas or in small villages.  
B. State Aid and Investment Principles  
In case a Member State supports the roll-out of broadband 
by way of an equity participation or capital injection into a 
company that is to carry out the project, it becomes 
necessary to assess whether this investment will be 
regarded by the EU as State Aid. In principle, State Aid can 
play a useful role in cases where the market does not 
provide sufficient broadband coverage. The concept of “pure” 
State Aid is defined in Article 87 of the European 
Community Treaty as "any aid granted by a Member State 
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods that 
shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be 
incompatible with the common market" [14]. 
 
In order for a measure to qualify as State Aid, the following 
cumulative conditions have to be met:  
1. The measure has to be granted out of State 
resources;  
2. It has to confer an economic advantage to 
undertakings;  
3. The advantage has to be selective and distort or 
threaten to distort competition;  
4. The measure has to affect intra-Community trade.  
On the other hand, there are two scenarios in which public 
investment is not regarded as State Aid in accordance with 
the Case-law of the European Communities (“ECJ”):  
(a) When the capital placed by the State - directly or 
indirectly- is at the disposal of an undertaking in 
circumstances which correspond to normal market 
conditions, it cannot be regarded as State Aid on 
the basis of the principle of equal treatment within 
Member States Members. In this case, referred to 
as the market economy investor principle, the 
market terms for the public investor should be 
clearly demonstrated by indicating equal or higher 
private investment or by a reliable estimate of 
return-on-investment based on a sound business 
plan. 
(b) When the Member State may consider that the 
provision of a broadband network should be 
regarded as a service of general economic interest 
("SGEI") [13] as qualified by the Altmark criteria, 
the State funding may fall outside the scope of 
State Aid.   
III. COST BENEFIT MODELING FOR THE PASSIVE 
INFRASTRUCTURE  
Although deploying an all-fiber network requires more than 
purely installing the cables in the ground, it is typically the 
dark fiber infrastructure (also called passive infrastructure) 
that takes up the largest part of the cost (typically around 
70%) [1]. Therefore, this section will only focus on the cost 
benefit analysis for the physical infrastructure provider. 
Note that all calculations throughout the paper are based on 
a point-to-point (P2P) access network topology, because this 
technology allows more flexibility in terms of unbundling 
and open access (access can be granted at both dark fibre 
and bitstream layer, while on a point-to-multipoint (P2MP) 
topology, only bitstream access is technically possible) [15]. 
Although the paper analyses P2P infrastructure, it has to be 
mentioned that the cost of deploying a P2MP network will 
not differ significantly, as the main part of the cost for 
physical infrastructure deployment (up to 80%) is spend on 
civil works [1], which is similar for both topologies.  
A.  Scenarios based on area type and expected adoption  
In order to get a good overview of possible outcomes of the 
business case, nine different scenarios will be studied. These 
nine scenarios represent a combination of adoption curve 
and area type. The adoption curves and areas types were 
not designed to reflect specific areas or situations in 
dedicated regions in Europe, but aim at providing a range of 
situations possible to occur (comparable to the approach 
taken in [3]). Depending on the area and uptake 
expectations, a different scenario might be chosen to reflect 
investment decisions. 
 
1) Area types  
Three specific area types are considered: dense urban, 
urban and rural. They differ in number of households, 
surface and therefore also cable distance or trenching length 
(Table I). The parameters were set to optimize the use of 
cabinets and central offices, and based on discussion with 
the project partners within OASE.  
 




Urban  Rural  
Number of HH 15,600 8,640 3,060 
Surface (km2) 5 24 57 
HH density 
(HH/km2) 
3,120 360 54 
Fiber length per 
HH (m) 
831 1300 2563 
Trenching length 
per HH (m) 
6.75 19 46.65 
 
2) Adoption curves  
The outcome of a business model proposal depends heavily 
on the time-dependent uptake of the product or service by 
the end-consumers, since exactly these end-consumers have 
to pay back the investment. In order to reflect this 
uncertain take-up, we estimated an adoption curve, which is 
based on the forecasted yearly change in penetration 
depicted by a discrete form of the Logistic diffusion model 
[16]. For more details on the model used to determine these 
curves, we refer to [17]. 
To model different levels of generic curves, input values for 
three countries were chosen, because they represent typical 
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deployment and uptake status in Europe (Fig. 1). The likely 
curve represents an average adoption uptake and speed, 
and is modeled based on the forecast for the Netherlands 
(where some fiber networks are already present). The 
aggressive curve models a fast uptake of a large-scale 
deployment and uptake, as forecasted for Slovakia, while 
the conservative curve is based on the forecast for Germany, 
which has a lower speed of adoption than average.  
 
 
Fig. 1. The adoption curves for the scenario studies 
B. Total cost of ownership for a dark fiber network  
Deploying the passive infrastructure requires a huge initial 
investment that consists of manual labor cost for trenching 
and costs for fiber cables, ducts and micro-ducts. The 
combination of this outside plant cost with the upfront cost 
for installing the necessary, passive, equipment in the 
central office and street cabinets (e.g. Optical Distribution 
Frame (ODF) racks), results in the total Capital 
Expenditure (CapEx) for the PIP (Fig. 2). Note that we only 
take into account the cost for the access network; our model 
makes the assumption of not including the in-house cabling 
and deployment. This cabling can in some cases be taken up 
by the house owner (in case of single units), or outsourced 
and paid by the housing organization (in case of multi-
dwelling units), and is therefore not a standard cost for all 
operators deploying in Europe.  
Apart from the upfront investments, there are also costs 
during the lifetime of the infrastructure: a cable may break, 
which requires digging and splicing to repair, and renting 
costs for the floor space in the central office have to be paid 
every year. These yearly recurring costs are grouped as 
Operational Expenditures (OpEx). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Overview of the passive infrastructure in a P2P network 
 
The summation of both CapEx and OpEx results in the 
Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) of the passive 
infrastructure, and was modeled in more detail in [15]. The 
main parameters are summarized in Table II and were, 
similar to the area types, set based on discussions with the 
OASE partners. Here, we only show aggregated results on 










Trenching (per m) €50 €35 €20 
Duct (per m) – 
depending on diam 
€3 - 6 
Fiber cable (per m) – 
depending on number 
of fibers per cable 
€0.3 - €1.7 
 
Outdoor Cabinet €7500 
Floor space (per m2 
per year) 
€220 €110 €170 
Labor cost (per hour) €45 
 
The TCO of the physical infrastructure for the three areas 
clearly reflects the differences in number of users and 
average distance covered per user (Fig. 3). For the reference 
scenario, we use a planning horizon of 20 years (based on 
the trade-off between the lifetime of a passive network and 
the desired payback period of private investors in the 
current economic climate), and a discount rate of 5%, which 
is based on the reference discount rate for a large 
infrastructure investments, as set out by the European 
Union [18], and followed by some countries (e.g. the 
Netherlands [19]).  
Note that a key assumption in our analysis is that the cost 
of the civil works will not reduce significantly in the long 
term because it is labor related, while the electronics costs 
can significantly reduce, according to learning curves’ 
theory [20]. The labor related costs are based on an average 
of values found for Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Sweden Greece and Hungary, for the three types of areas 
[21]. 
As the PIP cost is nearly entirely driven by upfront 
distance-based trenching cost, there is negligible impact 
from the adoption curves, therefore only the results for the 
likely curve are shown here. When considering the cost for 
the physical infrastructure spread over all potential 
customers (cost/HP = cost/ home passed), we clearly see that 
this is growing with a decreasing household density and 
therefore increasing trenching cost per household.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Total Cost of Ownership for the PIP, cumulative and 
discounted over 20 years (for likely adoption curve) 
 
Note that the cost/HP in the dense urban area (572 euro) is 
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rural area (1764 euro). On the other hand, the TCO for the 
physical infrastructure also reflects the overall surface and 
total amount of customers per area. Here we observe that 
the overall cost for the rural area (5.40 million euro) is 
significantly smaller than that for the urban area (9.45 
million euro), which is only based on the significantly lower 
number of customers. The cost for the dense urban (8.92 
million euro) is only slightly smaller than for the urban 
area. 
C. Expected revenues for a Physical Infrastructure Provider  
Despite massive changes in the telecommunications offer 
(from voice and analogue TV to Voice over IP, digital TV 
and fixed and mobile broadband), the total household spend 
on communications services, as well as the allocation of this 
amount over the different types of services, remains static 
over time [22]. Revenue models for funding the physical 
infrastructure can therefore be based on (i) regulated DSL 
or fiber unbundling offers, or (ii) on revenues from existing 
cases.  
In the first case, we can expect the PIP revenues to fall in 
the same range as the current DSL unbundling offers, since 
new fiber alternatives should be able to compete with 
existing DSL offers, especially in urban areas. We therefore 
compare revenues for a FTTH infrastructure provider with 
the charges OLOs (Other Licensed Operators) currently pay 
to the incumbent for unbundling of the local loop (LLU) in 
DSL networks. These regulated prices vary amongst EU 
Member States, but the average OLO pays between €7 and 
€10 per customer per month for the use of the unbundled 
DSL local loop [23], [24].  
Secondly, there currently exist real-life case studies that 
apply the open access business model with different actors 
on different layers. Stokab, the PIP in Stockholm for 
example, charges €5 to €7 per customer per month for dark 
fiber access in the inner city [25]. Another example can be 
found in the large-scale deployment of fiber in the 
Netherlands by Reggefiber, which agreed with OPTA (the 
Dutch National Regulatory Authority) on prices for ODF 
access on a regulatory basis, where an operator can choose 
to apply a region-based tariff or the average national charge 
of €16.39 per customer per month [26], [27]. 
Taking the average of the DSL LLU prices (€7 - €10) and 
the dark fiber access prices of Stokab (€5 - €7) and 
Reggefiber (€16), we can assume that a future PIP can 
expect around €10 per customer per month. When 
comparing this value to the basic internet offers of DSL 
incumbents (in the range of €25 for use of the 
infrastructure, equipment and services), assuming €10 for 
the use of the infrastructure only seems fair for a 
competitive provider. As such, this value will be used as an 
assumption value for the remainder of our calculations in 
this paper. 
D. Cost Benefit Analysis for the nine scenarios under study  
Now the costs and revenues for the passive infrastructure 
have been described and analyzed separately, this section 
will combine them in investigating the economic viability of 
the business case for a physical infrastructure provider for 
the different scenarios described above.  
 
1)  PIP business case over 20 years  
With the assumptions at hand, the business case for the PIP 
over 20 years is only viable in a dense urban area with 
aggressive adoption (Fig. 4). This means that in all other 
cases the monthly revenue of 10 euro for the PIP does not 
suffice to cover for the costs. This observation can be 
interpreted in two ways. Either the observed time frame of 
20 years (or the combination of the time frame of 20 years 
and the used discount rate of 5%) is not appropriate for the 
evaluation of an infrastructure project as considered here; 
or 20 years is the right timeframe indeed and the business 
case simply does not fly based on the current regulatory 
prices. As such, high investments in fiber access 
infrastructure can be considered unlikely. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Cumulative costs, revenues and NPV for the physical 
infrastructure for the reference scenarios 
 
However, referring back to the real-life deployments 
operational today (e.g. Reggefiber, Stockholm, etc.), we see 
that the responsible companies are successful and even 
expanding their rollouts. Revisiting the parameters used by 
changing the market, infrastructural and regulatory 
developments could therefore increase the coverage of viable 
roll out, but even more subsidies are necessary to make the 
business case profitable in any area, as will result from the 
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2) Revenue needed per home connected 
In the previous section, we have calculated the PIP business 
case starting from known revenues. However, the reverse 
calculation can give another insight in the problem: we can 
calculate the revenues needed (per subscriber and per 
month) based on the known TCO. The following formula is 
used:  
           
 
      
                  
  
   
 
 
where   
- X  = revenue per user per month 
- A(i) = absolute adoption in year I, determined 
according to section III.A. 
- r   = the discount rate 
 
The formula takes into account a monthly ARPU of X 
(multiplied by 12 to arrive at a yearly ARPU), the absolute 
uptake (adoption) of customers and a discounting factor to 
incorporate the time value of money. By equating this 
revenue potential to the above calculated TCO, the needed 
monthly ARPU can be derived. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Revenues needed per subscriber per month for the physical 
infrastructure for the reference scenarios 
 
The obtained required monthly revenues per home 
connected for the break even case (Fig. 5) confirm our 
previous results: only in the dense urban area with the 
aggressive adoption curve the needed revenue per user and 
per month (8.6 euro) is lower than the price cap of 10 euro, 
following the assumptions of section III.C. In all other 
scenarios, a much higher monthly revenue is needed (for 
urban at least 16.5 euro, for rural even 26.5 euro, both for 
the aggressive adoption curve)! Although recently changed 
and discouraged, these outcomes match nicely with the 
geographic-dependant price settings used by Reggefiber (see 
section III.C). 
One important remark that should be made at this point, 
deals with the focus of the model. Although the model was 
built using a bottom-up approach, thereby ensuring that all 
relevant parts of the technical calculations are included, the 
model does not take into account business related and 
management costs, which are also referred to as transaction 
costs. In general, a transaction cost is a cost related to an 
economic exchange, and typically consists out of three parts: 
search and information costs (related to the amount of 
standardization of the processes), bargaining costs 
(negotiations needed in order to settle the contracts) and 
enforcements costs (required to make sure everything works 
according to the agreements made) [28]. Although the 
existence of transaction costs is widely recognized, this 
paper focuses on the technical production costs and 
therefore does not take transaction costs into account.  
Furthermore, recent literature [29] has shown that in 90% 
of investigated large transportation projects, actual costs 
are higher than estimated costs, on average 27.6%. Since 
telecommunication access network deployment can be 
categorized as a large infrastructural project, like roads and 
railways, it is likely to experience the same effect. 
Taking these two reality checks into account when 
analyzing the results of the business case leads to a risk 
that obtaining a zero-NPV in an upfront modeling, feeded 
with realistic data, could still not be economically viable in 
real-life.  
IV. HOW TO IMPROVE THE BUSINESS CASE?  
Since the results from section III indicate rather negative 
business cases, while real-life deployments prove the 
potential economic viability, the model should be adjusted to 
better reflect improvements measures applied in reality. 
This section proposes some specific measures that could be 
taken to make the investment in a passive infrastructure a 
good choice from an economic point of view.  
 
























Needed monthly ARPU for the reference scenarios
€ 10
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A.  Impact of demand aggregation  
 
Fig. 6. Cumulative costs, revenues and NPV for demand 
aggregation of 20% and 40% on top of the aggressive adoption curve 
 
The business case for the PIP is especially difficult because 
of the combination of a high upfront investment with 
revenues that have a very slow uptake. One solution could 
be to have high revenues sooner in the project lifetime. 
Demand aggregation is a process in which interested 
customers sign a cooperation agreement before the 
deployment is started. In this way areas can be chosen in 
which there will be a guaranteed uptake from the start. For 
example, Reggefiber (the Netherlands) requires, depending 
on the cost for the envisaged area, a level of 30-40% demand 
aggregation before starting the deployment [30].  
Based on these realistic assumptions, we have modeled the 
impact of demand aggregation of 20 or 40% on the adoption 
curve, by adding this percentage to the expected adoption. 
However, we assume that the curve does not exceed the 
original maximum adoption percentage.  
In the dense urban case, the original aggressive curve 
already led to a positive business case, which is clearly 
strengthened by an additional demand aggregation. For the 
urban area, we see that the negative NPV of minus 4 
million euro is halved by demand aggregation of 20% and 
nearly equaled out by a level of demand aggregation of 40%. 
The rural case remains difficult though. 
Of course, aggregating demand requires extra costs for 
marketing you offer, and going door-to-door for customer’s 
agreements. This cost however is low compared to the 
overall gain, and can - to some extent- replace the cost of 
marketing in a later stage. Another advantage of demand 
aggregation is the reduction in uncertainty and the cost of 
estimation.  
B. Impact of duct reuse  
It is clear from Fig. 3 that the majority of the PIP costs, and 
by extension of the entire FTTH deployment cost, is in the 
CapEx. More specifically it is in the trenching and ducting 
cost (because we consider only buried deployments), which 
is significantly higher than the cost for the fiber itself [7]. In 
case some parts of the ducts can be reused, this will 
therefore lead to a significant cost benefit. Actual duct reuse 
can take different forms. Of course, “old” telecom ducts used 
in the copper network can be an option, but for example in 
Paris, fiber was deployed in sewer systems [31].  
To quantify the effect of possible duct reuse on the business 
case for the PIP, we compared three scenarios (the 
percentages differ for the areas under study and are based 
on discussions with the project partners of OASE [32]):  
- a greenfield deployment, where no ducts can be re-
used,  
- a “small” scenario, where between 25% and 70% of 
the ducts in the feeder fiber section can be re-used, 
and 15 to 20% in the distribution cable section of 
the network (Figure 2),  
- a “large” scenario, with a duct re-use of 35 to 80% 
in the feeder fiber section, and about 20 to 40% in 
the distribution cable section.  
The variances in duct reuse are explained by a different 
estimation of the available ducts in the different areas: the 
available ducts will be much higher in a dense urban region, 
where most probably, an existing telecom network is 
already present, while the availability and/or quality of 
current telecom network is rural areas might be much 
lower. 
 
Fig. 7 shows the impact of the three levels of duct reuse on 
the TCO, which clearly is significant. It should be noted that 
this duct reuse does not always come at zero cost, as owners 
of the ducts (other operators, utility companies) can charge 
for their use. In the case an incumbent deploys the fibers in 
ducts previously used for copper cables, the costs can be 
assumed negligible (this is the assumption used in this 
paper, which follows the views by OpenReach, UK, who 
report a charge per annum of less than €1 [33]). It should 
furthermore be noted that, when evaluating P2MP 
topologies, the duct reuse in the feeder fiber section might 
be higher, as this topology uses a lower number of feeder 
fibers than P2P, and as such requires less spare capacity in 
existing ducts [3]. 
Because of the higher duct reuse in the dense urban area, 
the savings that can be achieved are also higher (savings up 
to 32% compared to 15% in the rural area). Reusing ducts 
makes the business case better, but still not economically 
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Fig. 7. Impact of small and large reuse of available ducts on the 
TCO of the PIP 
 
Reusing available ducts is only one option to reduce the 
overall trenching costs. These costs can also be lowered by 
using other techniques, like for example, direct buried cable, 
which installs the cables in a very narrow trench [34]. In the 
Netherlands, this deployment, immediately in the road, was 
considered. Aerial deployment using poles or facades is 
another, cheaper option for deployment [35]. However, in 
some countries, aerial deployment is not allowed under 
regional legislation (e.g. major parts of Belgium) or there is, 
as for example in the Netherlands, “a silent assumption 
among permitting local governments that new FTTH-
outside plant will be trenched” [36].  
Finally, the deployment of FTTH can be combined with 
other utility network rollouts (e.g. water, gas, electricity, 
etc.), which can entail cost savings of up to 21% [37]. The 
disadvantages of this latter approach are clearly the cost of 
needed coordination: joint rollout requires synchronized 
planning amongst all utilities, as well as synchronized 
operations and repair of the cables. Research [38] has 
furthermore proven that it is not always clear where 
existing ducts lie exactly, neither is it a foregone conclusion 
on who owns them. The European Union follows this line of 
thoughts, as they specify in their guidelines [13]: “Member 
States may decide in accordance with the EU regulatory 
framework for electronic communications, for instance, to 
facilitate the acquisition process of rights of ways, to require 
that network operators coordinate their civil engineering 
works and/or that they share part of their infrastructure. In 
the same vein, Member States may also require that for any 
new constructions (including new water, energy, transport 
or sewage networks) and/or buildings a connection suitable 
for NGA should be in place”. 
C. Prolonging the planning horizon  
Since the passive infrastructure that is currently providing 
internet, the incumbent’s copper network or the cable 
operator’s HFC (Hybrid Fiber Cable) network, has been 
deployed decades ago, and still has not reached the end of 
its lifetime (if there would be no need for higher speeds, the 
copper networks could still be used much longer), it is likely 
to expect that the same holds for the dark fiber cables. It 
thus makes sense to prolong the planning horizon, since it is 
very likely that the dark fiber infrastructure will generate 
revenues for more than 20 years. Furthermore, prolonging 
the business case will also extend the adoption curve, 
leading to a higher adoption potential in a later stage of the 
project (Fig. 1). These revenues are not captured in the 
initial business case with a lifetime of 20 years. 
On the other hand, the current economic investment climate 
is reluctant towards granting loans for long-term payback 
periods. The argumentation for the long lifetime of the fiber 
infrastructure should therefore be assured, as some now do 
by comparing broadband infrastructure to other network 
infrastructures, such as electricity or water, roads or 
railways [19]. 
When considering discounted cash flows over a period of 40 
years (2010-2050, Fig. 8), we observe a discounted payback 
time of less than 40 years in the dense urban scenario, 
independent from the adoption curve. Also for an aggressive 
adoption in the urban scenario, we see a positive case in less 
than 40 years. The rural case, however, never breaks even 
within the observed time span. 
 
 
Fig. 8. NPV curves for a prolonged planning horizon of up to 40 
years 
 
The difference between the business case for 20 years and 
30 years is much higher than going from 30 to 40 years. 
This can be explained by two effects. First, in 2030, the 
adoption curve hasn’t reached its maximum potential, so 
more customers will subscribe in 2030-2040 (while the 
number of new subscribers between 2040 and 2050 is 
negligible). Secondly, the further in the future the revenues 
are paid, the higher the effect of discounting, and thus the 
lower the impact on the cumulative revenue. Therefore, we 
decided not to look beyond a business case of 40 years. 
D. Additional revenue sources  
Results up till now have assumed PIP revenues based on a 
per customer fee (of maximum 10 euro), in some cases 
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differentiated based on the associated cost (Reggefiber 
model) combined with an expected adoption for advanced 
broadband services. However, we can imagine additional 
revenues for a physical infrastructure provider, as the dark 
fiber he deploys could also be of interest to non-telco 
customers. These revenues can be significant, as Stokab 
reported they can add up to 50% of their total revenue [39].  
Possible additional revenues can come from large 
businesses or public institutions (like administrations, 
hospitals, schools, etc.) that want to rent an end-to-end dark 
fiber connection, and use their own active equipment for 
lighting it up. This ensures a safe and secure connection 
between multiple establishments of one enterprise (e.g. a 
bank). If an FTTH network is present, it can also be used as 
a backhaul network for Next-Generation wireless offerings, 
such as Long-Term Evolution (LTE) networks. The base 
stations of these networks can be connected to the fixed 
fiber network, and the wireless operators pay their fair part 
of the lease.  
The quantification of these effects however falls outside the 
scope of this paper.  
E. Combining improvements 
Although all separate improvements clearly benefit the 
economic outcome of the business case, they will most 
probably not be applied in isolation in real-life cases. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows scenarios (especially in the 
urban and rural region) that do not find a positive outcome. 
It therefore makes sense to combine the improvements to 
verify whether positive business cases for those areas can be 
reached. 
We chose here to implement a selection of combined 
scenarios: small or large duct availability, a demand 
aggregation of 20 or 40% and a planning horizon of 20 or 40 
years. These combined improvements were compared to the 
reference case (which is the aggressive adoption curve, no 
duct availability, no demand aggregation and a planning 
horizon of 20 years). Fig. 9 shows the results for the three 
regions under study. 
Taking into account the assumed ARPU of €10 per month 
(red bold vertical lines in Fig. 9 we see that the business 
case in a dense urban region is actually very positive, with 
all scenarios remaining well below this threshold. For the 
urban area, we see that especially the longer planning 
horizon proves a significant improvement to the business 
case. The combination of this longer planning horizon with 
one other measure (at least 20% demand aggregation or a 
small duct availability) is sufficient to arrive at an 
interesting economic case. In the rural area, however, these 
conclusions do not hold and the business case will never 
prove to be economically viable.  Even when being able to 
reuse about 50% of ducts (large availability, which is a 
rather unlikely scenario due to the low overall availability 
of “old” infrastructure in rural areas), attracting 40% of 
households from the start, and amortize the investment 
over a time-span of 40 years, the business case still need 
more than the assumed €10 monthly ARPU… 
 
 
Fig. 9. Needed revenues per home connected for different 
combinations of combined improvements for the business case for 
the Physical Infrastructure Provider 
F. Use of State Aid or other public funds  
In the previous sections we have indicated that, despite 
some improvement measures, the business case for the 
physical infrastructure provider remains very difficult, 
especially in rural areas. Despite of the potential additional 
revenues from e.g. non-telco customers, the cost reduction 
based on duct reuse and the positive impact of demand 
aggregation on the timing of the revenues, it is clear that 
there will remain scenarios (combinations of areas and 
adoption curves) that will not result in a positive business 
case.  
In case the provision of a broadband network is regarded as 
a service of general economic interest ("SGEI") [13], state 
funding might fall outside the scope of State Aid and 
therefore could be a solution to make the case economically 
viable. Otherwise, in case physical infrastructure is 
deployed by some undertaking, state funding might still be 
involved (e.g. in a Public Private Partnership) when the 
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capital placed by the State - directly or indirectly- is at the 
disposal of an undertaking in circumstances which 
correspond to normal market conditions. A third option 
allows Member states to call upon the Universal Service 
Directive to fund underserved regions. This directive 
specifies that: “Member States must ensure that the 
electronic communications services detailed in the Directive 
are made available to all users in their territory, regardless 
of their geographical location, at a specified quality level 
and an affordable price” [40]. Finally, when assigning Right-
of-Way privileges to operators for densely populated areas, 
obligations to serve other remote regions can be coupled 
(cross-subsidizing). 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
In its Digital Agenda for Europe, the European Commission 
stresses the need for high-speed broadband deployment and 
uptake. Progress in FTTH deployment in Europe however 
stays limited, as the main argument remains that the initial 
investment is too high. This paper investigated the business 
case for the physical infrastructure provider in a buried 
deployment, as previous research has shown that the civil 
works needed for deploying this infrastructure take up to 
70% of the total investment. Different scenarios have been 
calculated, based on reference areas (urban, dense urban 
and rural), as well as likely, aggressive and conservative 
adoption curves. Based on an average monthly ARPU of 
max 10 euro, the case is only profitable in a dense urban 
area with aggressive adoption. In the other scenarios, the 
estimated payback time clearly exceeds the considered 20 
years, thereby fiercely increasing the investment risk. 
 
It thus makes sense to take a closer look at the business 
case assumptions, and identify potential refinements that 
can improve the case and hence reduce the economic risk. 
Demand aggregation ensures a significant market share 
and therefore revenue immediately after deployment by 
having interested customers sign a cooperation agreement 
upfront. A level of demand aggregation of 40% can nearly 
make all scenarios in urban and dense urban areas 
profitable. Taking advantage of duct reuse has an important 
impact on the cost base; and leads to significant decreases of 
the trenching costs. Reusing ducts results in a very positive 
business case for a dense urban region, and makes the 
required investment pit for the urban and rural regions less 
deep, but does not result in a positive business case. 
Another option is to look for other types of customers than 
the pure residential ones: additional revenues from public 
institutions or businesses (both large, medium and small 
enterprises) can help to improve the case. Furthermore, as 
we are considering an infrastructure investment here, it 
might make sense to prolong the planning horizon beyond 
20 years. A discounted payback time of less than 40 years 
was observed in the dense urban scenario, independent from 
the adoption curve. Also for an aggressive adoption in the 
urban scenario, we see a positive case in less than 40 years.  
Since in real-life projects, these proposed improvement 
measures will not be implemented in isolation, but 
combined where possible, the paper investigated this impact 
too. When using more than one improvement measure, the 
business case for the dense urban area proves to be 
successful in almost all scenarios; for the urban areas, not 
all scenarios result in a positive outcome, but successful 
business cases can definitely be found when directing the 
market parameters right. We therefore suggest that 
Member State plans should comprise a balanced set of 
policy actions to incentivize and supplement private-sector 
action, with targeted measures for different region types. 
Private investment should be encouraged by appropriate 
coordination of planning and rules for sharing physical 
infrastructure and by targeted financing measures to reduce 
risk and promote new open infrastructures.  
 
Despite all measures discussed above, even if combined, the 
business case for the physical infrastructure provider in 
rural areas seems not to fly. The use of public funds might 
be the only way out. If the Member State considers the 
provision of a broadband network should be regarded as a 
service of general economic interest, state funding might fall 
outside the scope of State Aid and could therefore be 
feasible. The same holds when the capital placed by the 
State is at the disposal of an undertaking in circumstances 
which correspond to normal market conditions. 
The Recommendation on regulated access to Next 
Generation Access (NGA) networks suggests enabling 
attractive and fair profits for investors. If implemented, 
regulated prices for access to fiber networks should 
therefore fully reflect investment risk for the investing 
companies. Regulated fiber access prices are only available 
in a few Member States now (like the Netherlands), 
however, based on the discussion above we can assume that 
they will or should on average be clearly higher than the 10 
euro assumed throughout this paper. Furthermore, in order 
to remove risk for the PIP, fiber access prices can reflect 
costs in some way, e.g. taking into account distances or area 
types. 
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